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Citizenship, Cowardice and Freedom of Conscience: British Pacifists in the 
Second World War1 
Abstract 
Freedom of conscience is widely claimed as a central principle of liberal 
democracy. But, what is conscience and how do we know what it looks like? 
Rather than treat conscience as a transcendent category, the paper examines 
claims of conscience as always rooted in distinct cultural and political 
histories. In particular, it does so through examining debates about 
conscientious objection in Second World War Britain. The paper argues that 
in Second World War Britain, persuasive claims of conscience were widely 
associated with a form of ‘detached conviction’. Yet, evidence of such 
‘detached convictions’ was always on the verge of being interpreted as 
deliberate manipulation and calculation. More broadly, the paper argues that 
the protection of freedom conscience is necessarily incomplete and unstable. 
The creation of persuasive claims about conscience requires the meeting of 
evidential conventions. But, a conventional conscience can seem like no 
conscience at all. As such, the difficulties in recognizing individual conscience 
point to the internal anxieties of liberal democracy. It is not simply the 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Lori Allen, Lotte Hoek, Adam Reed, Jonathan Spencer, 
Mathias Thaler, and Erica Weiss, as well as audiences in Copenhagen, St Andrews, 
Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Montreal, Bern, Edinburgh, Amsterdam, Sussex and 
Oxford, and the four anonymous reviewers for CHSS, for their very helpful and 
insightful comments on pervious versions of this paper. I would also like to thank 
Lucy Lowe and Alice Forbess for their invaluable research assistance. 
 
 3 
stranger that is suspect and mistrusted, but those who claim to stand most 
strongly by the principles of liberal citizenship.   
 
Introduction 
In the summer of 1940 Roy Ridgway appeared before a Tribunal in West London and 
argued that he should be exempt from any form of military service.2 German troops 
were occupying most of Europe, allied soldiers had just been evacuated from 
Dunkirk, and the Battle of Britain had begun just a few days previously. Ridgway, a 
clerk in a North London cake factory, argued that ‘love and not force is the ultimate 
power in the universe…’3 By the mid-1940s over four million people were serving in 
the British armed forces. However, those people who held a ‘conscientious objection’ 
to military service could apply for exemption. Ridgway was applying for such an 
exemption, supported only by letters from friends and his own convictions. In doing 
so he joined over 60,000 other British citizens who claimed they had a profound 
objection to bearing arms.  
 
War creates acute ethical dilemmas about life and death, freedom and duty. 
Compulsory military service in a time of war poses questions about the obligations 
that people feel they owe their country in times of war, leading to tensions with, what, 
as a form of short hand, I shall call ‘liberal democratic’ models of citizenship. For 
proponents of liberalism, forcing someone to fight for a cause they may not believe in 
can go against the principle of individual autonomy. Yet, at the same time, the 
obligation to fight for the state and nation in times of emergency can be said to be a 
responsibility that arise from mutual dependence (Walzer 1970). How can a loyal 
                                                 
2 Papers of Roy Ridgway, Imperial War Museum Archive (IWMA). 
3 Ridgway, Diary 1 March 1940. 
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citizen refuse an apparent obligation to serve others, without removing themselves 
from the claims of citizenship? How can those that act in the name of the state 
demand that citizens kill or be killed against their will? It is here that the notion of 
conscience comes in. By exempting certain categories of people from compulsory 
conscription on the grounds of ‘sincerely’ held beliefs, the protection of freedom of 
conscience provides a compromise between the obligations to defend your country 
and the right to exercise freedom of choice. 
 
For much of the twentieth, century freedom of conscience was seen as a central 
principle for liberal poltical cultures, and can be found in numerous national 
constitutions and human rights conventions.4 The 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, for example, declares in its very first article that all human humans are 
‘endowed with reason and conscience’. In this vision, to be human is to have a 
conscience, and to have a conscience is to be able to act as a moral agent. For the 
political philosopher Martha Nussbaum, to ‘violate conscience is an assault on human 
dignity’ (2012, 65). Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure similarly argue that forcing 
someone to act against deep conscientious convictions constitutes a deep ‘moral 
harm’ (2011). Scholars more critical of liberalism too have seen conscience as central 
to liberal subjectivity (Foucault 1983, 212; Rose 1989, 22). Liberalism may not be the 
only historical tradition that has prioritized conscience (see for example Chadwick 
1968). However, for advocate and critic alike, freedom of conscience is widely 
regarded as being closely tied to liberal democracies.  
 
                                                 
4 Freedom of Conscience is recognized in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 8 
of the African Charter on Human Rights. 
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However, if freedom of conscience is so important, what is it and how do we know 
when we see it? Conscience has been understood variously as a gift from God, a type 
of rational reflection, an intuition, or a form of judgment (Andrew 2001; Baylor 
1977). Conscience can be seen as a capacity of all humans, or a chosen few (Locke 
1689). It has also been conceptualized as being located internally, socially, or in the 
divine.  Over the last two hundred years, conscience has been understood by 
philosophers as an ‘impartial spectator’ (Smith 2010, 12), an ‘internal court’ (Kant 
1996, 189), and a ‘painful feeling’ (Mill 2002, 41), amongst other things. In general 
though post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment political-philosophy has 
emphasized conscience as a form of individual moral guidance and autonomy (Taylor 
1992a, 29; Rawls 1993). At this point, two crucial general developments take place. 
First, conscience becomes thought of as potentially separate from religious belief or 
thought. Second, conscience becomes deeply associated with the internal moral life of 
the individual.  
 
Those who act out of conscience must constantly try and make that conscience 
publically legible to others in order to have social and political purchase. As Hannah 
Arendt argued, a central problem of a politics that seeks to prioritize conscience is 
that the origins of claims to conscience in interior moral sentiments can make them 
politically unpersuasive (1972). Individual conscience needs to be proved and 
demonstrated to be socially and politically persuasive. The recognition of conscience 
can be seen as part of a broader ‘politics of recognition’ (Honneth and Frazer 2003; 
Taylor 1992b). For its critics, the liberal politics of recognition is too narrow in terms 
of the forms of life and cultural values it is able or willing to acknowledge (Povinelli 
2002). Do claims of conscience, for example, far from being a universal attribute of 
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all humans, simply reproduce ideas of moral personhood with very particular roots in 
the history of Christianity? At the same time, there are also questions about how and 
whether liberal regimes are able to recognize particular instances of the very values 
they claim to uphold. Alongside the general question of how we define conscience, 
there is the question about how to recognize specific claims as ‘genuine’ incidents of 
conscience. The recognition of conscience is as much a problem of culturally 
persuasive proof as it is of ethical definition. 
 
Academic discussions of conscience have largely been philosophical, legal and 
theological (Andrew 2001; Arendt 1972; Maclure and Taylor 2011; de Jong 2000; 
Evans 2001, Walzer 1970; Nussbaum 2008). However, there is nothing self-evident 
about the particular importance placed on or the forms that conscience is thought to 
take. Claims of conscience have distinct cultural and political histories. Making such 
points is not to deny the potential ethical importance of conscience, to deconstruct it 
into thin air, or to point out internal inconsistencies. But neither is it to take 
conscience for granted as a self-evident and universal ethical category. Rather, it is to 
take a middle ground and to ask how is it possible to talk about conscience at all, and 
what it is possible to say when doing so? In doing so, we can begin to understand the 
role that claims about conscience in the experience of ‘actually existing liberalism’. 
 
What did persuasive claims of conscience look like in mid-twentieth century Britain? 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the association of conscience with non-
conformist Christian pacifism was widespread across Europe and North America. 
However, pacifism was far from being a settled Protestant tradition, and pacifism is 
itself a very specific application of the principle of conscience. It is perfectly possible, 
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for example, to imagine someone arguing that they were taking up arms as a matter of 
conscience, for Christian or non-Christian reasons. British law was unique in the mid-
twentieth century in not requiring a formal religious affiliation for the recognition of 
conscience. In practice, persuasive claims of conscience were widely associated with 
a form of ‘detached conviction’ that was understood as moderate and tempered. 
Claims that seemed too passionate, political or based on apparently esoteric forms of 
religious faith risked being taken as self-interested or incoherent. Yet, evidence of 
‘detached convictions’ was always itself on the verge of being interpreted as 
deliberate manipulation. Claims of conscience therefore walked a tight rope between 
seeming neither too fervent nor too calculated. Freedom of conscience was most 
readily recognized when it was thought not to be freely chosen. It was evidence of 
long-term affiliation with a mainstream Protestant Church that was most persuasive. 
Conscience in wartime Britain therefore moved uneasily between the formally 
religious and the secular.  
 
Attempts at the protection of conscience face a central conundrum. If conscience is 
not defined a priori, attempts at recognition remain necessarily arbitrary. The object 
that is being protected remains vague and shifting. Yet, at the same time, if attempts 
are made to define conscience, restrictions are being placed on the very forms of 
freedom that are being protected.  A pre-determined conscience seems like a very 
peculiar type of conscience. Conscience is made unfree is some way. The central 
argument of this article is that the protection of conscience is necessarily unstable and 
diminished. The production of persuasive evidence requires the meeting of social and 
cultural assumptions about the appearance of conscience. However, the very meeting 
of evidential conventions in itself undermines the apparent sincerity of the claim to 
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conscience. A conventional conscience can appear like no conscience at all. The move 
from conscience as an abstract category, to conscience as a specific and particular 
claim is therefore fraught with suspicion. Although Conscience is protected as an 
abstract principle, the people who make claims of conscience are mistrusted. 
 
The difficulties in recognizing individual conscience point an internal anxiety within 
liberal democracies: Critical scholarship has often looked to the margins in order to 
find the sites where the contingent and arbitrary nature of liberalism are revealed (Das 
and Poole 2004). As Erica Weiss has argued though, conscience reveals the inner 
limits of liberalism (2012). Hesitations about claims of conscience are not only 
produced by an encounter with difference, but also by with sameness. Difficulties in 
having claims of conscience recognized are often as much to do with similarity as 
alterity (compare Kelly and Thiranagama 2011). Liberal democracies can be deeply 
suspicsious about those who claim to stand most strongly by its principles. 
 
The following discussion is based on archival research within the letters and memoirs 
of, as well as oral history interviews with, Conscientious Objectors (COs) and their 
families.5 These are held at the archives of Imperial War Museum, the Peace Pledge 
Union, the Central Board for Conscientious Objectors, Mass Observation Archives, 
and the National Archives. The very existence of such documents can be seen as the 
product of an ‘ethical practice that demanded persistent self-contemplation’ (Feldman 
2007, 692). COs constantly reflected on their positions and tried to persuade others of 
their convictions, leaving behind a rich documentary trace. The paper begins by 
setting out a very brief history of the place of conscience within the rights and 
                                                 
5 The full exploration of the experiences of the officials who dealt with claims of conscience is an 
important and interesting topic, but for reasons of space, will not be the focus here. 
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obligations of British citizenship. It then examines the history of British pacifism 
between the two world wars, in order to set out the moral repertoires available to 
British pacifists in the early 1940s. The next two sections examine how COs sought to 
make persuasive claims about their conscience before Tribunals. It concludes by 
putting British debates about conscientious objection in comparative perspective. 
 
A Very Brief History of British Conscience 
Historically, freedom conscience has been included in English law as part of a 
pragmatic compromise, balancing claims of productive citizenship with a stress on the 
importance of inner conviction. In Seventeenth Century England, for example, 
conscience was not simply a category of religious faith, but was also part of a wider 
debate about civic participation.  The Toleration Act of 1689 established the right of 
Protestant dissenters to conscientiously object to taking a religious oath. The Act was 
based on the assumption that Puritans wanted to be active citizens, particularly 
through lending money to the king, and it was therefore financially counter-
productive for the crown to exclude them (Wyckes 1994). Crucially, the Act gave no 
rights to non-Protestant confessions. Two centuries after, in the late 1800s, a 
conscience clause was used to mediate tensions over mandatory vaccination (Durbach 
2001). The anti-vaccination movement based its campaign for exemption on the claim 
that their members were rational and responsible citizens. Exemption was eventually 
allowed for practical reasons, as it was proving difficult to force parents to allow their 
children to be vaccinated, and fines did not seem to be curbing opposition. Crucially, 
the nature and content of conscience were not defined in law. 
 
The conscience clause in the law of military conscription was similarly a product of 
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compromise. Britain has historically avoided compulsory military service. The British 
government introduced conscription for the first time in 1916- much later than most 
European states. For its advocates in Britain, a voluntary army was preferable to one 
based on conscription, due to the perceived greater moral virtue of its soldiers. A year 
into the First World War, the Member of Parliament G. N. Barnes, argued, for 
example, that ‘I refuse to believe that volunteerism is going to fail us, because to 
believe that would be almost tantamount to believing in the moral bankruptcy of the 
nation’.6 By 1916 though, voluntary recruitment was proving an inefficient system for 
recruiting the necessary manpower needed for the armed forces. However, when 
conscription was first proposed, trade unions and members of the Liberal party 
objected to the potential for forced labor. Exemptions for COs was created in order to 
prevent a parliamentary revolt over the bill (Rae 1970, 26). To gain support from 
socialists and atheist parliamentarians, the Military Service Act 1916 also did not set 
out the grounds for conscientious objection, which formally could include both 
political and religious claims. The Act simply stated exemption could be granted ‘on 
the ground of a conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service’.7 
Importantly, Ireland and the colonies, as well as all women, were exempted from 
military service. Conscription, and therefore conscientious objection, was limited to 
those who were assumed to be the most committed citizens. At its heart conscription 
was not simply a method of labor recruitment, but was treated as a fundamentally 
moral issue to do with the obligations and loyalties of citizens.  
 
Tribunals were set up in order to make decisions over the precise nature of the 
exemption, which could be absolute, conditional or refused. In practice, absolute 
                                                 
6 Hansard HC Deb 2 November 1915. 
7 Military Service Act 1916, Article 2(1)(a). 
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exemption on grounds of conscience was relatively rare. The Tribunals, which also 
heard cases for medical exemption, contained army officers and local dignitaries, who 
saw their principle job as recruiting for the military. During the First World War 
16,000 people appeared before the Tribunals seeking exemption on the grounds of 
conscience (Rae 1970). Of these, over six thousand were arrested after their 
applications were denied and they refused military service.  
 
Following the reintroduction of conscription in 1939, the conscience clause was 
retained. Many leading COs from the First World War were now senior politicians, 
with at least three serving in the war-time government, including Home Secretary 
Herbert Morrison.8 Taking lessons from the First World War, the British government 
and military were reluctant to force people who did not want to fight to join up. As 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain put it, ‘in the Great War... I think we found that 
it was both useless and an exasperating waste of time and effort to attempt to force 
such people to act in a manner which is contrary to their principles’.9 Importantly, the 
conscience clause was seen by its creators as proof of British commitment to freedom. 
Lord Beveridge declared in a radio broadcast that ‘admission of the right of 
conscientious objection to serve in war is the extreme case of British freedom. Nor 
have I any doubt that it makes Britain stronger in war rather than weaker’ (Hayes 
1949, 6). The Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Lang, similarly argued that ‘At time 
when we are claiming… that freedom of conscience must everywhere be honoured, it 
obviously is our duty to show that we fully support it’. The protection of conscience 
was claimed as a key mark of British difference from the totalitarian states of 
                                                 
8 The two others were, Labour MPs Philip Noel-Baker who was Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Minister of War Transport, and Arthur Creech Jones, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of 
Labour. 
9 Hansard HC Deb 4 May 1939. 
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mainland Europe.  
 
As in the First World War, the Tribunals could grant full exemption, conditional 
exemption, or dismiss the application. Conditional exemption was usually granted on 
the grounds that the applicant was willing to do some specific work of ‘national 
importance’. In 1941, for the first time, women too were made liable for conscription 
to specific auxiliary units. Women could also opt to take up civil defense or industrial 
work, and were never obliged to carry arms. Married women or women with children 
under the age of fourteen were exempt altogether. 
 
The Who, What and Why of Conscientious Objection  
Those who applied for exemption did not represent all those who objected to war. 
There were others ways of avoiding military service, such as working in a reserved 
profession, or simply going AWOL. Many people emigrated, sought medical 
exemption or went on the run. Angus Calder has argued that in 1943 alone over 
300,000 people were discharged on medical grounds (1993, 336). Estimates put the 
numbers who went AWOL over the course of the war at more than 100,000 (Glass 
2013). It is likely that at least some of these people were motivated, in part, by an 
objection to combatant duties. As such, it is also probable that only a small minority 
of those with a political or moral objection to war sought registration as COs. 
Registration as a conscientious objector therefore represented a very particular 
attempt to give a public presence to claims of conscience.  
 
The numbers of people applying of military exemption on grounds of conscience 
ranged from 2.2% of those conscripted in October 1939, to 0.57% by mid-1940 
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(Barker 1982). Stereotypically, COs came from the intellectual middle classes, but in 
practice they ranged from skilled laborers to white-collar workers.10 Among those 
who sought registration, Quakers and Methodists were particularly prominent, but 
there were also members of the Church of England and Catholics, as well as Jehovah 
Witnesses, Christelphians, and others, including socialists and secular humanitarians. 
The vast majority of applicants claimed a religious or a mixture of religious and moral 
motivations for the objection.11  
 
To say that someone had a pacifist conscience, on its own, says very little. To take a 
negative stand against war is not necessarily, to take a stand for anything in particular. 
During the First World War, the socialist left had been the leading voice among 
conscientious objectors. Resentment at the Generals and politicians who sent men to 
their slaughter, combined with economic misery and recession, to make class based 
opposition to war particularly compelling. However, the seemingly natural alliance 
between pacifism and socialism would not last. By the late 1930s, civil war in Spain, 
and the increasing threat of fascism, forced many socialists to feel they had no choice 
but to support war against Germany. As Fenner Brockway, an Independent Labour 
Party MP who had been imprisoned in the First World War for his opposition to 
conscription put it: ‘I was in all my nature opposed to war… But I saw that Hitler and 
Nazism had been mainly responsible for bringing the war and I could not contemplate 
their victory…. I could no longer justify pacifism when there was a fascist threat’ 
(1977, 135). By the start of the Second World War, socialist opposition to military 
service was highly equivocal.  
 
                                                 
10 Jobs of COs. April 3 1940. MOA TC6 Box 1 File A 
11 Report on COs, July 1940. MOA TC6 Box 1 File A. 
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Many pacifists sought to justify their position through a mixture of Christian doctrine 
and humanistic morality. For Christian pacifists, Christianity was essentially a 
religion of non-violence. Jesse Hillman, for example, an Anglican railway clerk from 
south London who later became a vicar, later argued that before the war ‘it seemed to 
me it was quite illogical to try and follow the example of Christ and use the methods 
of modern warfare’.12 Similarly, William Elliot, the son of a train driver from Surrey, 
who like Hillman, later became a vicar, believed that ‘the whole life and example of 
Christ’s teaching indicates quite clearly to us that to take another life would be 
incompatible with being a follower of our Lord.’13 Elliot felt that just as Jesus had 
refused to lead a war of rebellion against the Romans, twentieth century Christians 
should refuse to take up arms. Christian pacifists were often adamant that pacifism 
was the only way of being a Christian.  
 
However, support for pacifism was far from being a self-evident Christian position. 
The Church of England and the Anglo-Catholic hierarchy had long supported the 
British military. William Temple, who would go on to be Archbishop of Canterbury, 
described pacifism as a ‘heresy’.14 Elsewhere, Baptists spent four years deliberating 
before coming down on the non-pacifist side. Methodists decided not to take a formal 
position. There were of course anti-war groups within British Christianity. However, 
these were usually small and inward looking sects such as Jehovah Witnesses, 
Christelphians, and Plymouth Brethren. Furthermore, Jehovah Witnesses are not 
pacifist in the narrow sense of the word. It is not to fighting in all wars that they 
object too, merely ungodly wars. The Quakers are probably the group most associated 
in the popular imagination with Christian pacifism. However, in the First World War, 
                                                 
12 Interview with Jesse Hillman, 21 March 1980, IWMSA. 
13 Interview with William Elliot, 1983, IWMSA. 
14 Times Newspaper, 29 October 1935. 
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over a third of Quaker men of eligible age served in the military in some way (Ceadel 
2002, 23). Indeed, the historian of British pacifism, Martin Ceadel has argued that, it 
was only after the First World War that Quaker pacifism became a relatively settled 
and absolute position (2001, 23).  
 
It is important to note here that many COs saw themselves as loyal British citizens. 
Although pacifists could have a commitment to brotherly love or class solidarity that 
stretched across national boundaries, they were also often keen to stress their 
patriotism. Roy Ridgway, a London CO, wrote in his diary, ‘The love of one’s 
country is inherent in everyone’.15 Indeed, many COs saw the scope for pacifist 
society as most suited to what they understood as a particularly British tolerant 
sensibility. John Hunt would later recall that he thought ‘there must be something 
right with a country who would allow people to take up this stand, because I know 
nowhere else in the world where it would have happened in this way’.16 Similarly, 
C.H. Smith wrote to a friend shortly before he appeared before a Tribunal, ‘you know 
this is a remarkable country- so much so, that it is not easy to refuse the services they 
demand.’17 Conscience was seen by many COs as part of their patriotic duty. 
 
When the fighting started in 1939, public hostility towards COs was not nearly as 
intense as it had been in the First World War.  In 1916-18, those who refused to fight 
were often detained, beaten, harassed, and in a few cases shot. The conscientious 
objector was seen as the anti-thesis of the heroic British soldier: selfish, cowardly, 
indolent and degenerate (Bibbings 2009). Tribunal judges, many of whom were 
military officers, would insult those who came before them, and routinely refuse any 
                                                 
15 Ridgway, 1 October 1939, IWMA. 
16 Interview with John Hunt, 6 April 1998, IWMSA. 
17 Letter to George, dated 16 April 1943. Private Papers of C.H. Smith 88/10/1 IWMA.  
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dispensation. Objectors were consistently sent to jail, released, and then detained once 
more if they refused to fight. Even after the war ended, many conscientious objectors 
were not released from prison. Some went on hunger strike, and over 190 were 
eventually force fed. Those who were put under military detention were 
disenfranchised for five years.  
 
In relative contrast, during the Second World War, many COs commented on the 
general ‘tolerance’ shown to them by the wider population. COs recall that people 
would tell them they disagreed with their stance, but respected their position from 
principle. John Hall-Williams, a CO from a middle-class Welsh speaking family from 
South Wales, would later remembered being ‘treated with courtesy and respect’.18 
Similarly, Ray Bellchambers, a CO from Buckingham who worked as a farm laborer 
during the war, recalled that amongst his colleagues ‘generally speaking there was a 
lot of tolerance. There were a few who were very bitter and sarcastic about it, but 
generally that did not make too much difference’.19 Bernard Hicken, a South 
Yorkshire Methodist, who volunteered to undertake medical trials, would recall that ‘I 
did not have unpleasantness from people, let me say that people were very tolerant’.20 
A poll taken in February 1940 claimed that 40% of respondents did not know what 
they thought of COs, and more than 25% said they were ‘tolerantly disposed’ towards 
COs.21 In April 1940 only 14% thought it was a bad thing for pacifists to be allowed 
to publicly express their opinions.22  
 
                                                 
18 Interview with John Hall-Williams, 30 March 1995, IWMSA. 
19 Interview with Ray Bellchambers, 1983, IMSA. 
20 Interview with Bernard Hicken, May 1995, IWMSA. 
21 Report on Conscientious Objectors, July 1940. Mass Observation Archive (MOA) TC6 Box 1 File 
A. 
22 Supplementary Report on COs. 16 September 1940. MOA TC6 Box 1 File A. 
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The change in attitude towards COs has to be understood, in part, against the 
background of the different ‘moral economy of sacrifice’ in the Second World War 
when compared to the First (Allport 2010). Whereas during the First World War, the 
home front remained relatively unscathed, during the Second World War, those who 
stayed at home faced relative hardships. Air raids and rationing produced real 
privations. The result was that the sacrifices of those serving in the armed forced were 
not as heavily privileged over those of the civilian population.  Whereas the violence 
on the home front could have added pressure on COs to take up arms to protect their 
country, it also created spaces for them to take up alternative forms of service for the 
country. This moral economy of sacrifice must also be placed in the context of new 
forms of masculinity. As the historian Sonya Rose has argued, by the late 1930s, male 
heroism was not simply associated with individual acts of spectacular bravery, but 
rather was also culturally understood to lie in the ordinary acts of unexceptional 
people (2003). For Rose, inter-war British culture saw an emphasis on a form of 
‘tempered masculinity’ (2003, 154). British COs could therefore potentially 
participate in ‘tempered masculine virtues’, without taking up arms.   
 
Despite their claims to patriotism and the general sense of tolerance, COs could still 
face a great deal of criticism, at work, in public, or even from family and friends. 
George Orwell was amongst the most prominent critics, famously claiming that: 
‘Pacifism is objectively pro-Fascist… If you hamper the war effort of one side you 
automatically help out that of the other…’ (1942). For Orwell, pacifists were naïve at 
best, dangerous at worst. Attacks on COs though were not limited to harsh words. 
Occasional direct pressure was applied. Over one thousand COs were sent to prison 
after their applications for exemption were rejected, and there were relatively isolated 
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incidents of violence. More often however, criticism and pressure simply took the 
form of name calling, or a sense that people were talking behind your back.  
 
Against background of competing loyalties and limited but consistent public criticism, 
the decision on whether to apply for exemption on the grounds of conscience could be 
difficult. Pacifists were caught in a web of moral obligations to family, friends, 
colleagues, and country. The claims of conscience were rarely, if ever straight 
forward. Roy Ridgway only applied for exemption after a period of intense personal 
reflection and preparation. One month into the Second World War, Ridgway began to 
have doubts over his convictions. He would write in his diary that ‘some of the 
remarks that slip from me in conversation are not the words of a pacifist… I find 
myself saying things I ought not to say’.23 He was also being teased by his father, and 
was worried about his mother’s reaction. At work Ridgway was reprimanded by his 
boss, and was concerned that everyone thought he was a coward. Ridgway later 
recalled that ‘my heart said no and my head said yes, I was confused about it’.24 
Similarly, prior to his decision to register for exemption, Alexander Bryan, from a 
Yorkshire Methodist family, and studying to be a teacher in Sheffield at the start of 
the war, remembers being filled with ‘despair’, as his ‘mind was in turmoil’, and he 
began to ‘doubt the path’ he had chosen was the right one. As his friends criticized 
him, or avoided him completely, Bryan was ‘assailed periodically with doubts about 
the course’ he was taking. Ken Shaw, from the south London suburbs, who had a 
brother in the air force, and a father who thought that everyone should ‘do their bit’, 
also doubted whether, if given the choice between serving in the army and being shot 
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he would have the courage to refuse, describing himself as a ‘not very brave 
person’.25  
 
Conscience has often been seen historically as the ground of an authentic moral 
personhood. Martin Luther is famously reported to have said that ‘Here I stand. I can 
do no other’. This is an image of conscience that it resolute and individual.  Later 
scholars have understood conscience as being at the center of a modern sense of self.  
For Foucault, for example, the subject is ‘tied to his own identity by a conscience’ 
(1983, 212). Charles Taylor has argued that conscience is understood as the most 
intimate and essential aspect of a person (Taylor 1992). In this context, conscientious 
objection has been understood as an ‘unambiguous expression of morality. A clear-cut 
example of moral convictions’ (Levi 1997; 199). For British COs however, claims of 
conscience did not simply create a profound and clear sense of themselves,standing 
against the rest of the world. Instead, for those asking for military exemption, claims 
of conscience could produce an experience of estrangement and confusion about their 
own convictions and beliefs. It is in this context of hesitations about their own 
conscience that COs had to try and persuade others that they were genuine. 
 
Preparing for the Tribunal 
The application for exemption from military service was a short document often no 
more than a page long. The forms were mostly written in a conventional manner, 
stating that the applicant was a ‘conscientious objector’, and then setting out very 
briefly the grounds for this exemption. Charles Alexander of Peterborough, for 
example, wrote ‘being a true lover of the Lord Jesus Christ… I could not with a clear 
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conscience take life’. 26  Edwin Green wrote ‘I cannot reconcile the taking of life with 
the principles which one desires to live up to. A Christian should be marked by 
meekness, kindness and love’. F. Morel, from East London, argued that as ‘a member 
of the working class it has been my firm conviction for the past ten years that war 
does not solve any of the difficulties of the countries of the world, but only increases 
the poverty, degradation and misery of the working class’.27  
 
In the written application, conscience was often presented as stemming from a 
profound individual moral sense, despite the doubts than some COs might have had 
about their own convictions. For Jesse Hillman, ‘conscience was something that was 
so precious’ and he had no choice but to follow his conscience where it ‘led’ him.28 
Gwendolene Knight, a Quaker pacifist who worked as a volunteer in an ambulance 
unit, argued that ‘it does not matter whether pacifism is a success or not, that’s not our 
business... But if it is right then that’s what you’ve got to do’.29 Conscience was often 
portrayed as something that the applicants could not control. Alexander Bryan, for 
example, said he felt compelled to register for exemption by the ‘promptings of 
conscience’, and that as a CO he had ‘the right to obey the dictates of my 
conscience’.30 For F. Corsellis, an Anglican CO, his conscience was a product of the 
‘commands of the Sermon on the Mount’. Written statement, after written statement, 
presented conscience not as a choice, but as a duty.  
 
Making a written claim to conscience was one thing, but preparing to look genuine in 
person before the Tribunal was another. There was an awareness amongst COs that 
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the questions asked by the Tribunal members were relatively predictable and could 
therefore be prepared for. The Central Board for Conscientious Objectors (CBCO), a 
coalition of pacifist organizations, was the most significant source of information.31 A 
volunteer for the CBCO had advised Ridgway on the best way to present his case, 
suggesting that he did not seek unconditional exemption as he would be less likely to 
win. 32 The CBCO also often arranged mock Tribunals. Ridgway had been worried 
about how he might perform at the Tribunal, and therefore jumped at the chance to 
rehearse his case.33 The mock judges asked Ridgway about why he was willing to eat 
food imported by sailors who were risking their lives, why he paid taxes when those 
taxes were spent on weapons, and what he would do if Nazi troops occupied Britain. 
Ridgway became tongue tied and could not get the words out. After the hearing the 
judges all agreed that they found no one very convincing.  
 
The CBCO tried to avoid telling people what to say before the Tribunal, and instead 
concentrated in helping them think through their own case. One pamphlet advised that 
it was not designed to ‘help you to outwit the Tribunals, and get a better exemption 
than you deserve’. 34 Alan Staley, a Methodist who ran a mock Tribunal would later 
recall that they were very helpful ‘particularly when the person who was always most 
confident of himself had his statement torn to pieces’. 35 Staley insisted though that 
the Tribunals ‘never told you what to say. They just picked holes in what you were 
going to say so that you could see your own weakness.’36  
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There was a pervasive feeling amongst COs that preparing too much for a Tribunal 
could be counterproductive. The CBCO advised applicants to look spontaneous. One 
hand book suggested applicants ‘talk of your conscience without self-
consciousness.’37 Not preparing too much was an ethical as well as a practical issue. 
Some applicants were concerned that if they presented too polished a case, and were 
then exempted they would not be gaining exemption of the basis of their own beliefs, 
but its surface presentation. Bryan Alexander, a Quaker from Leeds, worried that if he 
had been granted complete exemption it would have been due to the skills of his 
advisors rather than his own ‘merits.’38 Similarly, Tony Parker, a socialist pacifist 
from Manchester, thought preparing too much would be ‘cheating in a way.’39 COs 
tried to become experts in presenting a form of conscience that did not appear too 
prompted or trained. 
 
Presenting Evidence of Conscience 
Roy Ridgway appeared before the Tribunal in West London on 17 July 1940. He 
would write in his diary that he thought the judges were already convinced that 
everyone who came before then was a ‘shirker’.40 In the event, Ridgway’s case did 
not last more than ten minutes. He was very nervous and later that day worried that he 
‘did not express myself clearly’. Ridgway had declared that all the early Christians 
were pacifists, but when pressed for their names could not remember any. He was also 
asked to explain what he meant by non-violent resistance, and he told the judge that in 
the event of a German invasion he would refuse to cooperate. One of the judges asked 
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whether he meant that, for example, everyone should refuse to mend broken drains, 
even if people were dying of typhoid? Before Ridgway could answer, another judge 
asked a further question about his vegetarianism and whether he wore leather boots. 
Ridgway replied that it was impossible to be completely consistent in anything. Judge 
Hargreaves, the senior member of the Tribunal declared that ‘non-violence is a joke’. 
Following a brief conferral amongst the judges, Ridgway was ordered to undertake 
non-combatant duties. Forty years later, Ridgway would look back on his experience 
and conclude that he had not been able to convince the Tribunal because his attitude 
had been a ‘little superior’.41 He recalled trying to persuade the judges in their ‘own 
terms’ rather than ‘expressing his own ‘feelings’. 
 
The Tribunal usually consisted of a judge, a trade union official, and more often than 
not an academic.42 Tribunal hearings would routinely begin with the Tribunal 
members reading the typed statement of the applicant. The applicant would then be 
asked if he wanted to add anything to his statement or submit other forms of evidence, 
either in the shape of witnesses or letters, before being questioned on the basis of their 
objection.  
 
The Tribunals seemed constantly suspicious that people were seeking exemption from 
military service out of cowardice or laziness.  As one judge put it, the Tribunal had to 
ask questions ‘to plumb the depth of an applicant's convictions, and to see that 
conscience is not made a cloak’ (Hayes 1949, 42). Another judge is reported to have 
said that ‘many of the Conscientious Objectors really mean that they are afraid of 
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being killed themselves when they say they do not want to kill other people’.43  For 
G.C. Field, a philosopher at Bristol University who sat on the Southwest Tribunal, 
judging the sincerity of a conscientious objector involved an evaluation of the 
‘temperamental and emotional factors which make up his character’ (1945, 106). He 
‘felt a suspicion of various motives at work…(such as) dislike of being disturbed in 
their accustomed way of life, dislike of being under discipline’ (1945, 107). Judges 
openly said they thought many applicants were not being entirely honest.  
 
The questions asked by the Tribunal would commonly try and tease out the 
consistency of the objection to violence. The experience of Alexander Bryan, a 
student from Sheffield, was typical.44 In the spring of 1940, Bryan appeared before a 
Tribunal in Leeds, and was asked how long he had been attending Quaker meetings. 
He replied that he had only been going a matter of months, and had been brought up 
in a Methodist family. Another member of the Tribunal asked him whether the 
University was maintained by public funds, and what he thought about the fact that 
much of this money was produced through the manufacture of munitions. After a brief 
conferral the chair of the Tribunal declared that Bryan was to be removed without 
qualification from the register. A few days later, Bryan received a letter informing 
him that ‘we have come to the conclusion that this is not a genuine case... He started 
to attend the Fiends’ meetings immediately after the outbreak of the war. He appears 
to us to illustrate the type of objector who says ‘I will not serve’’. 
 
Common questions at the Tribunal included:  ‘what sacrifices have you made for your 
principles?’, ‘What would you do if Hitler landed in England today?’, ‘Aren’t you 
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forgetting you neighbor in ‘loving your enemies’?’, ‘Would you use an air-raid 
shelter?’, ‘If you object to taking life are you a vegetarian?’, ‘Don’t you want to 
shorten the war by bringing it to a speedy conclusion?’.45 Many questions sought to 
examine the extent to which a CO would help another British citizen in the face of 
Nazi aggression. Perhaps the most common theme in questioning concerned what an 
applicant would do if their wife, sister or daughter was being attacked.46  
 
Those applicants who were more articulate were often perceived by other applicants 
to be more successful before the Tribunal. Mervyn Taggart, a privately educated 
London Quaker, would recall that ‘people who had not debated and discussed and 
thought a lot about this, people with a certain educational background, were at a very 
great disadvantage in Tribunals.’ 47 Ronald Mallone, a Christian pacifist and socialist, 
who was training to be a teacher, thought that his application had been successful 
because he had ‘taken care. I was a very vocal person and used to speaking in 
public’.48 Another observer would write that ‘an applicant who knows all the answers 
and can express themselves clearly stands more chance than one who may be just as 
sincere but cannot express himself so well.’49  
 
It was possible to be too articulate though. Judges widely objected to the use of 
‘jargon and cliché’.50 One judge complained to the Birmingham Post of ‘organized’ 
preparation, and said that it made their job harder to ‘break through the veneer and 
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varnish of artifice.’51 Judge G.C. Field, complained that the ‘regularity with which the 
arguments, and even the phraseology, of the different groups are repeated by one 
applicant after another suggests … a ready-made set of ideas taken from other people 
than an individual and independent examination of the problem’ (1945, 6). 
There was therefore a very fine line between the need to be articulate and the need to 
avoid sounding rhetorical and deliberate.   
 
Tone could be as important as content in presenting a persuasive claim. COs were 
widely advised to be polite and courteous, above all not appearing quarrelsome. Roy 
Ridgway’s brother, Derrick, had registered as a conscientious objector in 1940.52 
When he appeared before the Tribunal, the judge told him to take his hands out of his 
pockets.53 Derrick responded angrily that the Tribunal was a ‘farce’. The judge told 
him that he was a ‘very bad mannered man’. Derrick was refused exemption and told 
that he was ‘utterly insincere’ and had ‘no conscience in the matter at all’.54 Similarly, 
C. Worrall, a socialist pacifist from Manchester, was accused of ‘intellectual vanity’ 
by a judge after arguing back.55 COs were advised by supporters that ‘histrionics will 
do you no good.’56 One group of Christian pacifists told COs that ‘it is important to 
the most courteous… do not attempt to make debating points.’57  
 
Political objectors, predominantly socialists, had great difficulty before the Tribunal. 
They were often accused by judges of picking and choosing the wars they wanted to 
fight. One frequent observer of the Tribunal commented that socialist objectors ‘were 
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not well liked’.58 Judge G.C. Field argued that ‘the only genuine and logical 
conscientious objection on political grounds would be that of a convinced Fascist 
(1945, 15). The Ministry of Labour even went so far as to appeal any case where a 
political objector was granted unconditional exemption. 59 A CBCO observer at one 
Tribunal wrote that ‘the tribunal will not accept political objectors… and the only 
objectors who will be recognized are those who base their objections on religious 
grounds’.60 Given that many political objectors could also articulate their claims in 
more explicitly religious terms, they often did so. 
 
It was past, formal and long term affiliation with a pacifist group that was often the 
most persuasive evidence before the Tribunals. One judge in North West England 
argued that ‘we have found that the most important factor to consider was the 
religious or ethical background behind the objection’.61 Judge Burgis, who had taken 
sick leave after being attacked by an applicant, gave a speech on his return to work 
where he claimed that ‘we can only ascertain whether there is a genuine conscience 
and a deep conviction by getting to understand the background of the lives of each of 
those who come before us…’ (Barker 1982, 17). C. Worrall, a hospital administrator 
from Manchester, remembered that it ‘became obvious to me, that the tribunal 
members tended to find it more understandable that an applicant might have a 
conscientious objection to military service if he came from, what they perceived as a 
good ‘church background’.62 COs were believed most readily when they could show 
that they have attended a particular pacifist church or group over a long period of 
time, and best of all if their family were members as well.  
                                                 
58 Bloomsbury Tribunal January 16 1940. MOA TOC6 mx1 File A. 
59 ‘The Judges’. April 1940. MOA TC6 Box 2 File A. 
60 Memorandum. Political Objectors. No Date. Tribunal Box 6. CBCO Archives. 




Not all religious belief was persuasive before the Tribunal. Jehovah Witness, in 
particular, seemed to represent a form of religiosity that the Tribunal found hard to 
comprehend. Judge Field would go so far as to describe adherents as a ‘strange and 
even fantastic’ (1945, 17). Dennis Hayes from the CBCO concluded that Jehovah 
Witnesses found it most difficult of all applicants to persuade the Tribunal judges of 
their case. Hayes thought this was because Jehovah Witnesses were ‘more militant’ 
than other applicants, and seemed ‘impervious to argument on the part of the 
tribunal’.63 The professed neutrality of Jehovah Witnesses in ‘ungodly wars’ seemed 
hard for the judges to take.64  
 
Affiliation with Quakerism was thought to be most convincing. When Alexander 
Bryan appeared before the Tribunal, he asked an acquaintance from the Quakers to 
give evidence.65 Roy Ridgway would later recall that his association with Quakers 
through medical voluntary work had probably made his life easier when he was 
released from military prison.66 For some, an association with the Quakers was such 
persuasive evidence that they tried to downplay their own Quaker connections, lest it 
give them what they felt to be an unfair advantage. Mervyn Taggart later felt 
‘unworthy’ for raising his Quaker family history as he felt it made ‘it somewhat 
easier. People understood the Quaker position and by saying you were a Quaker … 
you did not have to explain in very great detail anymore.’67  
 




66 Ridgway IWMSA 
67 Taggart. 
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Faced with questioning of their own testimony, applicants would try and bring 
together as much other evidence as possible, as a way of trying to attest to their 
convictions. Roy Ridgway had set about collecting letters from friends and 
acquaintances who could confirm the sincerity of his beliefs. One friend wrote a letter 
saying that Ridgway was a ‘vegetarian because he believes it is wrong to kill animals’ 
and that ‘for many years he has been an ardent pacifist’.68 The chairman of his local 
pacifist group would write a letter stating that Ridgway was a ‘sincere pacifist’ and 
that his ‘attitude to war is not an isolated thing, but is part of his whole attitude to 
life’.69 F. Morel, a trade unionist on the East London docks, produced a letter from a 
municipal councilor stating that ‘I can verify … that he has been engaged for a 
number of years for the emancipation of workers and that he will not support any 
war’.70 Letters from church officials confirming that they thought an applicant’s 
convictions, although ‘perhaps misguided’ were ‘strongly held’, were particularly 
common.71 Second hand documentary evidence from ‘respected members of the 
community’ was seen as providing potentially more secure evidence of conscience 
than direct oral testimony from the person claiming exemption.  
 
In sum, claims of conscience seemed most persuasive when they were not thought to 
be freely chosen. The irony was that people who could show that their objection was 
part of a long family history, rather than personal critical reflection found it easier to 
get exemption. Evidence of deliberate reflection was in danger of looking like 
evidence of mendacity.  
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A Public Conscience 
The legal responsibility of the Tribunal was to make decisions on the genuineness of a 
particular claim to conscience. However, much to the annoyance of some judges, the 
law gave no direct guidance on the grounds upon which conscientious objection 
should be held. 72 The British Tribunals were therefpre formally open to accept any 
form of conviction as evidence of conscience, religious or secular, emotional or 
reasoned. 
  
Debates over the forms of emotional and rational justification through which 
legitimate claims can be made on public goods have been central to modern liberal 
politics (Habermas 2006; Mahmood 2006; Rawls 1993). At stake here is not simply 
the distinction between the religious and the secular, but rather broader questions 
about the forms of commitment and convictions that are deemed to have legitimate 
place in public life. In this context, the liberal public sphere is often analyzed in terms 
of an ideological split between the rational and emotional. For John Rawls, for 
example, personal convictions, religious or otherwise, need to be translated in 
seemingly neutral and publicly accessible comprehensive terms. (1993). The 
Rawlsian position has been criticized for its vision of neutrality, and for the way it 
limits the forms of conviction that have a place in public debate (Connelly 1999, 20). 
However, as Elizabeth Povinelli has argued, in practice, both the deliberative and the 
sensual are present in modern liberal ethical debate, forming a ‘zone of 
undecidability’ (2011, 88). The seemingly rational and emotional can combine to 
mediate the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
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When British Tribunals attempted to make judgments about whether to grant 
exemptions from military service, a form of conscience was promoted that seemed to 
walk the line between the coldly analytical and the passionately spontaneous. 
A claim to conscience that looked too rational was in danger of looking like self-
interest. A claim to conscience that seemed too emotional was in danger of looking 
close to cowardice or extremism. Those who were came across as politicized, 
adhering to forms of religiosity other than non-conformist Christianity, or 
impassioned and fervent, were least likely to be taken as having a ‘genuine’ 
conscientious objection. The COs that had most success in persuading the Tribunal 
appeared moderate and restrained. 
 
In prioritizing conscience the Tribunal and the people who appeared before it faced 
the problem of how to make interior convictions publicly present. The anthropology 
of religion has highlighted the ways in which otherwise invisible processes are 
mediated through material practices (Engelke 2010; Keane 2007). However, it is not 
only the transcendental claims of religion that need to be made concrete in order to 
have social and political purchase. Political convictions too need to be substantiated 
or they can remain intangible, illegible, and ineffective. As such, CO Tribunals should 
be understood in the context of a wider history of attempt to legally adjudicate on the 
inner life of individuals, ranging from criminal law concerns with intention, to the 
inquisition’s focus on the soul (comapre Halfin 2001; Kravel-Tovi 2012; Langbein 
2006). The key issue such processes face is how to make the internal motivations, 
qualities, desires and character of the person before them visible so that they can pass 
judgment on it.  
 
 32 
In Second World War Britain there were widespread claims that the CO Tribunals 
were being asked to do an impossible job. In the parliamentary debates over the 
National Service Act in 1939, there was suspicion that it was impossible to judge 
conscience at all. As Conservative MP Sir Arnold Wilson argued, the ‘mind of man is 
not triable’. 73 T. Edmund Harvey, and independent MP, similarly told parliament that 
‘there is no machinery which the House or any other House can set up for judging the 
conscience of men that would be satisfactory’.74 For many COs too, the rigorous 
public assessment of individual conscience was a futile task. John Wood, a London 
Quaker CO, would describe judges as ‘being in an impossible position’ as you ‘cannot 
really judge in human terms a person’s conscience. You can listen to what a man says 
about his conscience… but you can’t really decide that the man’s conscience tells him 
to do this or that… the judge has to judge by externals.’ 75 James Bramwell, a student 
from a wealthy Scottish family who served in a non-combatant unit, would conclude 
that he ‘very much doubt whether it is possible (to judge conscience)… They had to 
accept rather on the impression the person made’.76 Tony Parker would similarly later 
recall that he did not think it was feasible to know another person’s conscience.77 
 
The question of sincerity was central to attempt to assess claims of conscientious 
objection, and was constantly evoked and questioned at the Tribunal.78 Judges 
Wethered, for example, argued that his task was merely to discover whether a view 
was ‘honestly held’.79 Similarly, Judge Burgis told the Tribunal in Manchester that he 
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was principally concerned to discover whether views were ‘sincere and deeply felt’.80  
From this perspective, it was the depth of the objection that mattered, rather than its 
nature. For one judge: ‘All we have to consider is whether the views are sincerely and 
deeply felt’.81 COs therefore had to perform their sincerity before the Tribunal. This 
was a performance, in the sense that they had to put their conscience on show, so that 
it could be judged. As Lionel Trilling has argued, the norm of sincerity calls on 
people to be really the way that they present themselves to others (1972). However, 
Webb Keane points out that such a focus assumes that the words and signs through 
which sincerity is performed can have a direct relationship with the sincere self 
(1997). For Keane though, not only are the meaning of words anything but self-
evident, but equally importantly, there can be a limited sense in which people are felt 
to be the authors of the words they use. Keane argues therefore that the effect of 
performances about sincere intention depends on conventions (1997, see also Austin 
1975; Derrida 1973). The successful performance of conscience depends on cultural 
assumptions in order to bridge the gap between intention and its public display.  
 
It is the very performance of conscience though that risks making it unpersuasive. At 
one level, the space between internal conscience and its outward presentation creates 
space for doubt. The words, bodies and actions of through which conscience is made 
manifest constantly point to a lack (compare Butler 1990, 184). Interior conscience is 
not reducible to the ways it is presented, precisely because it is understood to reside 
internally within individuals. However, the issue is more than simply the problem of 
knowing other minds. Rather, the problem is also a product of the very notion of 
conventionally persuasive conscience. A conventional conscience can also seem 
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deliberate, cautious, premeditated and predetermined, everything that internal 
individual conscience is understood not to be. The act of making conscience public 
therefore opened it up to suspicion. As such, any attempt to perform conscience 
before the Tribunal raised questions about the intentions of the applicant, and the 
extent to which their conscience was being made transparent. For one, it was obvious 
that people could lie before the Tribunal. Anyone could say they had a conscientious 
objection. Claims of conscience were easy to make, hence the suspicions from judges 
about jargon and cliché. Other forms of evidence also raised questions about the 
intentions behind their production. A letter from a supporter attesting to the sincerity 
of an applicant’s convictions was a reasonably easy document to produce. As 
elsewhere, the truth of any document was not self-evident, producing its own 
suspicions.  
 
However, the point is not simply that claims conscience were always in doubt. Ways 
were found to put these doubts to one side, or at least come down on one side or the 
other, to decide whether claim were persuasive or not. Not all claims of conscience 
were denied after all. The question then is why and how were most claims formally 
accepted? Ultimately, trusting neither words nor documents as signs of conscience, 
and being unsure about what was being signified in the first place, the Tribunal would 
often try and avoid making firm determinations.  As such, a great deal of time at the 
Tribunal was spent questioning an applicant on whether they would do any form of 
alternative service, and if so what type.82 One of the three options available to the 
Tribunal was to grant conditional exemption. In practice, what was at stake in most 
determinations was not whether a pacifist would be forced to bear arms, but whether 
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he would be given non-combatant duty or fully exempted from national service.83 In 
this context, fewer than 5% of applicants were given unconditional exemption by the 
local Tribunals. Less than 30% were removed from the register completely. The 
remaining 65% were given some kind of alternative service (Barker 1982, 145). COs 
took up agricultural or forestry work, or various forms of broadly humanitarian work, 
as well as fire-watching, civil defense, social work. 
 
Many COs were keen to cooperate with the demand that their convictions be 
demonstrated through action. Indeed, many stressed that they were willing to help 
their fellow citizens and worried about being seen to ‘reap the rewards of the 
sacrifices of other people’.84 Bernard Nicholls, a Christian CO who carried out social 
work in the East End during and after the blitz, would recall that he did not see his 
pacifist stance as ‘involving a break with society… I saw it as a role to be played 
within society’.85 Those COs who did take up alternative service could often be 
highly critical of absolutists, seeing in them a self-centered martyr complex, or a 
naive and self-defeating attempt to cut themselves off from the world.86 For the 
Tribunal, and COs, labor became a way to objectify inner convictions, seemingly 
compensating for the otherwise relative lack of substantial, tangible and persuasive 
evidence to back up claims of conscience.  
 
Conscience in Comparison 
Conflicts over exemptions from military service go to the heart of the tensions 
between rights and obligation within liberal citizenship (see Cohen 1985). It might be 
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argued that conscription is no longer a central problem for liberal democracies. 
Britain, for example, has not had conscription since 1960, the US since 1973. The 
number of liberal democracies with compulsory military service has been in decline 
for several decades. Yet, precisely because it is such an extreme case, debates about 
conscription and its exemptions, can point to central fissures that run through liberal 
democracies.  
 
Twentieth century Britian represents a particualr form of liberal democracy, with a 
self conscious stress on individual freedom running alongside collectivist sentiments 
(Thompson 1962, 42; Freeden 1986). The way in which conscience was understand is 
arguably a key part of this particularity. The very fact that pacifist conscience was 
formally and legally protected is in itself part of the specificity of British liberalism, 
with its particular understanding of freedom and its limits. In 1916, Britain was 
among the very first states to introduce the legal possibility of exemption from 
conscription during war on the grounds of conscience. Other, largely Protestant states 
in northern Europe, would follow soon after. British exemptions were also formally 
wider than in other states, making no formal stipulation on religious content and 
setting out the possibility of absolute exemption. In the US, for example, during the 
First World War only Christian conscientious objectors from the historical ‘Peace 
churches’ were permitted to join non-combatant units, but not granted complete 
exemption.87 In contrast, conscription was introduced in Republican France in 1793, 
but exemption on the grounds of conscience was not allowed until 1963. 
Conscientious objection was not recognized at all in the Soviet Union.  
 
                                                 
87 Church of the Brethren, Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) and Mennonites. 
 37 
The second issue that is particular to British conscience is the types of evidence that 
were treated as persuasive. In perhaps the most extended ethnography of COs to date, 
Erica Weiss has argued, that Israeli COs, for example, are required to show the 
embodied grounds to their objection to military service and violence, often 
demonstrated through vegetarianism (2012). Principled arguments would not get an 
Israeli CO very far before a Tribunal (2012, 83). For Israeli COs, claims of 
conscience were most convincing to others when they were emotional and embodied. 
In partial contrast, in mid-twentieth century Britain, instead of visceral emotion, the 
presentation of claims of conscience was most persuasive when it was restrained. 
Conscience that seemed to have its roots in political conviction or esoteric forms of 
Christianity was much less convincing that mainstream Protestantism. Many COs 
were keen to present themselves as tempered, moderate, and loyal citizens.  
 
Many aspects of the history of conscience in mid-twentieth century Britain are more 
general. For one, the implicit or explicit collapse of freedom of conscience into 
freedom of religion are not particular to the British experience. In the 1960s, in 
response to objections to the draft in Vietnam era US, the Supreme Court ruled that 
conscience could apply to non-religious convictions. However, the foundational role 
of particular post-Protestant understanding of religion was maintained, when the court 
ruled the conviction must have a ‘parallel position’ in the lives of the holder to a 
belief in a ‘supreme being’, and ‘essentially political, sociological, or philosophical 
views were excluded’.88  The reduction of conscience to religious belief should, in 
part, come as no surprise. Although freedom of conscience is often seen as wider and 
more universal form of freedom than freedom of religion (Maclure and Taylor 2012), 
                                                 
88 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
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it is also important to remember the origins of liberal notions of freedom of 
conscience in the Protestant reformation. It is of course a mistake to confuse origins 
for current usages, but it is worth recalling, for example, that for John Locke, freedom 
of conscience was about protecting a narrow form of Christian dissent. Catholics, 
Muslim, Jews, let alone non-believers, were not thought capable of conscience. As 
Cecile Laborde has argued, freedom of conscience ‘ultimately “piggy-backs” on 
ideas, conceptions, and values that originally made sense in a world comprehensively 
structured by a broadly Christian ethics’ (2012). Ideas about what constitutes ‘good 
conscience’ are therefore have a strong tendency to fall back into ideas about 
Protestant forms of Christianity. 
 
The requirement that COs prove their convictions through labor is also widespread. In 
the US, during the Second World War, Civilian Public Service provided conscientious 
objectors with an alternative to the serving in military. In Germany by the 1990s, 
nearly half of those liable for conscription ended up doing social work (Kuhlman and 
Lippert 1993). The channeling of conscience into public service was the route taken 
by most European democracies that practiced conscription in the late twentieth 
century. This is a very particular ‘work ethic’ that sees attempts to produce evidence 
of conscience taking shape in labor for the ‘public good’.  
 
The demand to prove conscience through labor, points to a wider anxiety over 
whether it is possible to consistently and fairly judge conscience. Eleven of the 
European states that recognize the right to conscientious objection have done away 
with a personal hearing altogether, and decisions are made solely on the basis of a 
formal application. In Germany, in the years before conscription was abolished in 
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2011, up to 99% of applications for exemption were accepted (Kuhlman and Lippert 
1993). An implicit refusal to confront issues of conscience head on can also be found 
in the European Court of Human Rights- the jurisdiction with perhaps the most 
extensive and broadest jurisprudence on the right to conscientious objection- which 
seems to find it difficult to rule on particular cases. No absolute right to conscientious 
objection exists, but a qualified right to alternative service.89 More often than not 
though the court has decided to deal with cases of apparent conscientious objection as 
issues of equality, or the right to association.90 Liberal democracies therefore may 
promote freedom of conscience as an abstract principle, but they seem reluctant to 
judge individual conscience. 
 
Conclusion 
Why should a citizen of a liberal democracy die and kill for the state that is said to act 
in their name? A classic problem of political philosophy (Walzer 1970) is also a 
practical issue, whose implications are fought over on the ground. The partial answers 
that people find have important implications for the ways in which dissent is deemed 
acceptable or denied, particularly in times of war. We know a great deal about the 
conditions under which people kill or are killed for liberal democracies, as abstract 
ideas such as state and nation are filtered through obligations to friends and family 
(Bourke 2000). However, we are less able to offer explanations for how why some 
people can refuse to kill, often against extraordinary odds. In mid- twentieth century 
Britain, a claim to conscience was central to the effectiveness of any claim not to 
fight. Conscience marked the limit of the obligation to kill in the name of the state and 
                                                 
89 The UN Human Rights Committee has argued that the right to conscientious objection applies only 
to the use of lethal force, and not other forms of service. See, for example: UNHRC Communication 
No. 682/1996. 
90 Bayatyan v. Armenia [2011] ECHR 1095, 54 EHRR 15, (2012) 54 EHRR 15. 
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fellow citizens.  As a socially sanctioned form of dissent, the formal protection of 
freedom of conscience filled the gap between obligation and autonomy, between the 
responsibility to kill or die and the right to refuse.  
 
In mid-twentieth century Britain, freedom of conscience mediated the apparent 
tension between liberal freedom and duty, by collapsing the two together. Freedom of 
conscience was a very particular type of freedom, as people often did not feel entirely 
free to choose their own conscience. To make a claim of conscience was to make a 
claim to be unfree in some way. Many COs saw their conscientious objection as part 
of their obligations as citizens. More broadly, conscience has been widely understood 
as the grounds for individual dissent against the claims of the state (Thoreau 1983, 
387). Conscience is often viewed as a form of disobedience, dissension and discord. 
Erica Weiss argues, for example, that Israeli pacifists are seen, by themselves and 
others, as representing a fundamental challenge to the sovereignty of the state (2012). 
Yet, the vast majority of British COs were not challenging what they saw as the 
normative model of citizenship, and its claims of loyalty. Instead such claims to 
conscience were seen as proof of its existence. Conscientious objectors did not want 
to radically transform the forms of British citizenship, but saw themselves as 
committed to its central principles. 
 
Claims about freedom of conscience stood at the heart of British citizenship, and were 
not simply a peripheral concern for those at the margins of public life. Conscription 
and conscientious objection was reserved for those who enjoyed the full rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship, and as such reproduced exclusions based on nationality, 
race and gender. There was no conscription in Northern Ireland, for example, due to 
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concerns over the loyalty of the Irish Nationalist part of the population. Furthermore, 
in the small number of case where colonial subjects were conscripted, conscientious 
objection was not an available option (Kilingray 2010).91 British women were not 
liable for conscription until 1941 and then usually in civilian work. However, even 
after this date women often had great difficulty in persuading Employment Bureaus to 
register their applications for conscientious objection and were usually simply 
assigned civilian work (Hayes 1949, 267). The recognition of claims to conscientious 
objection was a privilege largely reserved for white British men.  
 
Whilst freedom of conscience has been valorized in the abstract, individual claims of 
conscience can be a source of anxiety. The legal protection of freedom of conscience 
highlights a form of citizenship that is ‘compromised, anxious, guilty’ at its core 
(Walzer 1970, 217). The grounds of any claim to freedom of conscience are rarely 
taken for granted. Nihilism, self-interest, and apathy can appear indistinguishable 
from conviction. Even those who have historically prioritized conscience have 
worried about it being misleading (see, for example, Locke 1689, 60; 1695: 254). 
Moral autonomy can also imply the autonomy to be amoral, immoral and even 
mistaken. Such questions about conscience are a product of a  broader liberal 
hesitation about the role of conviction in political life. Liberal democracies value 
convictions, in as much as they stem from the moral will of autonomous individuals, 
but convictions are mistrusted if they appear too fanatical, too fervent, or directed as 
the wrong type of goals. Cynicism about conviction has been seen as a hallmark of 
particular form of ‘modern’ ethical life (Sloterdijk 1988; Zizek 1989). However, 
                                                 
91 Similarly, at least in the initial years of the Second World War, America citizens of Japanese descent 
were not conscripted. 
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difficulties in protecting freedom of conscience point to a political culture that values 
conviction in general, but hesitates about the grounds to any particular claim.  
 
The legal protection of conscience speaks a language of universal tolerance and 
freedom. Yet at the same time, such legal protections also limits the types of 
conscience that are deemed legitimate, and the ways in which it can be articulated 
(Brown 2008; Mahmood 2012). Winnifred Sullivan has argued that the legal 
protection of religious freedom is an impossibility, as the law seeks to define what 
counts as religion, therefore limiting freedom (2007). The same can be said of 
conscience. On the one had freedom of conscience is promoted as a supposedly 
neutral and open principle, precisely because it is claimed that conscience can and 
should not be coerced or judged (see, for example, Maclure and Taylor 2012). 
However, in practice, what counts as persuasive individual manifestations of 
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